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Empirical Insights into Corporate Contractarian Theory 
 
Abstract – In UK and US company law and corporate governance, a highly influential 
economic theory views the company, and the rules related thereto, as a nexus of contracts for 
organising business activity.  This so-called contractarian theory of the company depicts 
fundamental corporate governance arrangements as a form of private ordering, in which rules 
are spontaneously produced in the absence of formal legal intervention.  This article draws 
upon broader empirical evidence of real world private ordering to make two essential 
arguments, which provide much-needed nuance to the idealised view of spontaneous 
governance found in the contractarian analysis.  First, it emphasises the significance of a 
distinctive and essential correlative and causal connection between hierarchy and the 
development and nature of private orders.  Second, it highlights the ways in which the state 
positively interacts with the purported self-regulatory capability of the market to produce 
these uneven endogenous rules. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of whether conventional legal approaches or private governance 
arrangements are the optimal rule-making strategy to regulate the complexity of corporate 
activity has led to much ink being spilled over the pages of legal monographs and textbooks, 
law review articles, and policy documents.
1
 This intense debate about apparently distinct but 
inter-related aspects of comparative institutional competence reached its apex during the neo-
liberal revolution of the 1970s, primarily in the US, but also a decade later when British 
accents joined the chorus.  A pivotal step in this turning point was the invocation of neo-
classical economic theory in legal literature, which, in essence, brought law and economics 
into the path of company and securities law.  The academic and practitioner narrative on both 
sides of the Atlantic Ocean, in turn, has coalesced increasingly around an economic paradigm 
                                                 
1
 This has been a central question in welfare economics since Adam Smith’s famous argument that the market 
would lead to the optimal allocation of resources to their highest and most efficient use.  See A. Smith, An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations (Clarendon Press, 1976 edn, R. H. Campbell and A. S. 
Skinner (eds)).  For an overview of the debates on private ordering and legal centrism, see general: 
‘Symposium: Law, Economics and Norms’ (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1643-2399. 
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that regards the company, and the rules related thereto, as no more than an explicit and 
implicit set of “private” contractual arrangements between shareholders, directors, 
employees, creditors, suppliers, etc.  This deregulatory, individualistic depiction of company 
law and corporate governance is referred to as the so-called “contractarian” or “nexus of 
contracts” theory.2 It seeks to explain the legal governance structure of the company, and 
company law more generally, as the endogenous outcome of a collection of autonomous and 
rational actors freely negotiating notional bargains to produce and enforce rules that regulate 
their exchange activities.  According to this logic, these market-based interactions generate a 
spontaneous order (rather than legal order established by authority) to govern fundamental 
aspects of organisational activity, which results from the individual participants naturally 
selecting and evaluating the optimal mixture of efficient rules and norms that create, modify, 
and transfer resources.  The law and economics brand of contractarianism has breathed new 
life into the shareholder primacy principle in UK and US company law and governance.  This 
pro-shareholder agenda typically denotes the corporate managerial standard of generating an 
optimal (or at least relatively high) dividend or capital return from a company’s business for 
the exclusive benefit of its equity holders.
3
 In particular, a contractarian analysis of the 
company, and company law generally, normally emphasises the constitutional primacy of 
shareholders over corresponding demands, and an entitlement to surplus profits based on 
ideals of free contracting and efficient institutional evolution.   
 
It would be erroneous to suggest that this article seeks to undermine the entirety of 
contractarian theory, or that it presents a universal challenge to the sources and contours of 
law and economics.  Nonetheless, it does sound a note of objection to two fundamental 
                                                 
2
 There are too many works written in this genre to cite exhaustively.  For the foundational literature, see below, 
n 27. 
3
 C. Mayer, ‘Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance’ (1997) 24 Journal of Law and Society 152 
at 155. 
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‘artificial and counter-factual’4 assumptions made by contractarian scholars when seeking to 
characterise fundamental features of corporate governance and company law in private 
contractual terms.  First, the article questions the idealised and therefore artificial basis upon 
which notions of individual rationality and uninhibited agreement are said to produce 
spontaneous governance, not least because this depiction of rule making ignores the role of 
hierarchy within these notional bargaining activities.  It submits, instead, that a causal and 
correlative relationship often exists between socio-economic hierarchy and the development 
of private orders.  This stratified governance structure incentivises power holders – such as, 
shareholders in a corporate setting – to err in favour of privately generated rules to maintain 
the beneficial power arrangement.  This uneven distribution of power incentivises or 
disciplines lower-ranking corporate participants, who are co-opted into this structure in such 
a way that they are prevented from dissenting, to interact with others, even when the norms 
and decisions might be unfavourable to the interests of those weaker participants.  Second, 
the article challenges neo-classical economic claims about de-centralised rulemaking, and 
submits that private orders do not necessarily emerge without overall design or operate at the 
margins of more traditional legal or regulatory structures.  Rather, it is important to 
understand the frequent interaction between law and markets, and the notion that non-legal 
systems typically displace in part, yet rest upon, the extant legal regime.  This view highlights 
how formal legal and political institutions are in general a vital pre-requisite for privately 
generated rule making, and that state interventionism normally constructs the conditions 
necessary for private orders in all sorts of cooperative interactions.  The integration of this 
dual form of power – through socio-economic pressure that stems from intragroup 
hierarchies, and the pervasive influence of the state in the structural emergence and 
                                                 
4
 M. Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart, 2013) at 247, observing that the theory has 
‘no innate empirical content but – rather – begins life as nothing more than a theoretical “empty vessel” that 
requires subsequent “filling” by scholars on an artificial and counter-factual basis”. 
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functioning of private markets – produces a twin reality of domination that privileges 
financial capital within the notional company.   
 
In order to make the arguments above, the article goes beyond orthodox company law 
discussion to examine in more detail the reality of neo-classical economic claims about 
spontaneous governance, and the role of the state, when seeking to explain prevailing 
corporate rules and institutions in private contractual terms.  This is achieved through a 
critical re-reading of two broader ethnographic case studies that purport to identify situations 
in which a wide range of human activity endogenously provides itself with informal law and 
order without state intervention.  The cases that form the basis of our empirical enquiry are 
the Diamond Dealers Club of New York,
5
 and rancher/farmer relations in Northern 
California.
6
 These real-world examples of mercantile activity and notional arbitration 
agreements are in general considered prototypes of private ordering in the wider literature.
7
 
However, an analysis of the two case studies illustrates in particular how the implicit or 
explicit cooperation and free bargaining within these intergroup relationships normally 
emerges and functions in the context of hierarchical structures and state interventionist 
strategies.
8
 It is important at this juncture to note, also, that the same structures and state 
                                                 
5
 L. Bernstein, ‘Opting Out of a Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’ 
(1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115. 
6
 R. C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press, 1991). 
7
 There is a range of other relevant cases that are not discussed in detail because of space constraints.  See 
generally, B. Richman, ‘Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond 
Industry’ in V. Gessner (ed.), Legal Certainty Beyond the State: Empirical Studies and Theories of Change 
(Hart, 2009) at 31; L. Bernstein, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724; M. Gomez, ‘The Tower of 
David: Social Order in a Vertical Community’ (2014) 10 Florida International University Law Review 215.   
8
 A number of historical cases have been used to suggest that private communities have both the incentive and 
the means of spontaneously evolving their own well-functioning law and order in the absence of any 
recognisable state involvement.  However, many of these examples appear to be taken primarily from stateless 
or nearly stateless social orders, and this contributes very little to understandings of “legitimate” private 
ordering within modern nation states in which an official, functioning legal system of some sort exists.  Further, 
there a number of naïve and factually incorrect assumptions that serve to undermine some of the overall claims 
made.  Accordingly, a discussion of pre-nation state or illegitiamte private orders is beyond the scope of this 
article.  For some representative examples from the literature, see e.g. B. L. Benson, ‘The Spontaneous 
Evolution of Commercial Law’ (1989) 55 Southern Economics Journal 644; T. L. Anderson and P. J. Hill, ‘An 
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interventionist strategies, which contribute to the emergence and functioning of private orders 
in close-knit communities, can emerge in a myriad of surprisingly impersonal or broad 
settings where parties do not repeatedly interact, such as high finance and business.
9
 Above 
all else, the insights and understandings that arise from these two case studies serve to 
essentially undermine a number of romanticised or subjective claims made by contractarian 
scholars about the institutional status quo in company law being endogenously produced 
through notions of individual rationality and internal agreement.  Up to this point, empirical 
or contextual evidence has rarely featured in the law and economics analysis of 
organisational activity.
10
 Indeed, despite significant and sustained treatment for several 
decades or more, the corporate contractarian analysis remains squarely situated within a 
theoretical framework.  Against this backdrop, it is submitted that too much intellectual effort 
in the contractarian tradition has been devoted to subjective description and explicitly 
normative writing, and that not enough has gone into discovering and understanding more 
about the physical or concrete experience of how private systems of rules work to regulate 
relationships among the groups that adopt them.  
 
A simple point, which has arguably taken on more urgency in light of the aforementioned 
criticisms about corporate legal writing, is well made by David Feldman, who wrote in 1989 
that ‘scholarship is related to the good of knowledge.  The object is to discover more about 
                                                                                                                                                        
American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not so Wild, Wild West’ (1979) 3(1) Journal of Libertarian 
Studies 9; Leeson, ibid at 143-144; P. Leeson, ‘Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government 
Collapse’ (2007) 35(4) Journal of Comparative Economics 689. 
9
 For some representative examples from the extensive literature on this subject, see J. Armour and S. Deakin, 
‘Norms in private insolvency: The “London Approach” to the resolution of financial distress’ (2001) 1 Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies 21; Bruce L. Benson, ‘Economic Freedom and the Evolution of Law’ (1998) 18 Cato 
Journal 209 at 218; H. Beale and T. Dugdale, ‘Contracts between businessmen: planning and the use of 
contractual remedies’ (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45S. Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual relations in 
business’ (1963) 28 American Sociological Review 45. 
10
 J. Armour, ‘Publication Review: An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy of Corporate Law’ (2002) 
61(2) Cambridge Law Journal 467 at 468. 
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whatever is being considered, and to understand is better.’11 Following on from this it is apt 
to note that the insights of this article contribute to a broader school of developing 
progressive company law scholarship, which seeks to refashion traditional thought paradigms 
by questioning, challenging and attempting add nuance to contractarian analyses of what a 
company is and why it exists.  The article makes a distinct and important contribution to this 
general line of argument by providing a fresh perspective and valuable insights for the 
practice and study of the design and/or operation of the corporate regulatory system.  In doing 
so, it discredits neo-classical economic predictions of companies and finance as responses to 
hypothetical states of the world.  On a more general level, meanwhile, the article will further 
undermine the conceptually and empirically tenuous association that is traditionally drawn by 
economic analysis between the goals and responsibilities of company law and the shareholder 
primacy principle.  The rest of the article proceeds as follows.  Part B provides an exposition 
of the contractarian theory of corporate governance arrangements, before Part C briefly 
illustrates the prevalence of the paradigm theory within the law itself, legal writing and 
general policy discussion.  This is done in broad strokes only and to the extent necessary to 
delineate the two aforementioned functional falsities that lie at the heart of this influential 
theory.  Part D then compares the article’s two over-arching claims to documented studies of 
private ordering, and this illustrative test suggests that the present argument is consistent with 
empirical examples in the private ordering literature.  Part E offers some concluding remarks. 
 
B. THE CONTRACTARIAN THEORY OF RULE CREATION 
 
                                                 
11
 D. Feldman, ‘The Nature of Legal Scholarship’ (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 498 at 498, observing that 
‘[s]cholarship is related to the good of knowledge.  The object is to discover more about whatever is being 
considered, and to understand is better.’ 
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The British courts have frequently asserted that directors are empowered agents of the 
company, with which they are situated in a fiduciary relationship.
12
 It is of course trite that, 
for over a century, companies have been regarded as having distinct juristic personality.
13
 In 
the fierce controversy over corporate personhood, however, one truism resounds through the 
literature: a company has ‘no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked.’14 This has 
generated problems of accountability of corporate boards in company law and academic 
writing.  The practical response from UK company law and policy, and many other 
jurisdictions inheriting British law, has been to use the economic logic and language of 
“agency”15 to justify the position of shareholders as de facto principal and monitor of the 
executive office-holders’ discretionary administrative power.16 Indeed, the law deploys 
multiple instruments to regulate and contain this managerial agency problem.  There are a 
number of important doctrinal rules that internalise the interests of shareholders within the 
boards’ managerial calculus.  This is known variously as the so-called shareholder primacy or 
shareholder exclusivity principle.
17
 Broadly speaking, shareholders have ultimate and 
revocable constitutional prerogative to draft and amend the articles of association,
18
 and 
                                                 
12
 Re City Fire Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] Ch 407, 426. 
13
 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22.  Of course, one should bear in mind that the Lords’ 
unanimous ruling was simply giving effect to the doctrine of corporate personality as enshrined in section 6 of 
the Companies Act 1862. 
14
 The quote is attributed to Baron Edward Thurlow, an eighteenth-century British lawyer and politician.  The 
quotation was given wide publicity by John Coffee Jr.’s influential article: ‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to 
Kick’: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment’ (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review 
386. 
15
 The most influential paper in this movement was Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Managerial 
behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
16
 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (HUP 1991) at 38, 67-68; 
William Klein, ‘The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints’ (1982) 91 Yale Law 
Journal 1521 at 1538-1540. 
17
 The literature on shareholder primacy is too voluminous to cite in its entirety.  Some useful examples include, 
Jonathan Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive 
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties’ (1991) 21 Stetson Law Review 23; Bernard Black and Reinier 
Kraakman, ‘A Self-enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1911; D. Gordon 
Smith, ‘The Shareholder Primacy Norm’ (1998) 23 Journal of Corporation Law 277.  On two very different 
interpretations of shareholder primacy, one based around shareholder protection and the other centred on 
shareholder empowerment, see Lyman Johnson and David Millon, ‘Misreading the Williams Act’ (1989) 87 
Michigan Law Review 1862 at 1899-1907. 
18
 Sections 21 and 33 of the Companies Act 2006.   
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collective ex ante appointment
19
 and removal rights 
20
 that they are entitled to exercise over 
the board of directors.  Additionally, directors are now obliged under section 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006 merely to “have regard to”, amongst other factors, the interests of the 
environment while seeking to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
shareholders.
21
 Shareholders also have the limited right to remedy managerial misfeasance or 
malfeasance on an ex post facto basis in court,
22
 as well as the no frustration prohibition in 
the UK Takeover Code.
23
 The story of UK company law in the twentieth century and early 
twenty-first century is thus one of a narrow depiction of the internal decision-making 
structures of business organisations, whereby corporate officers and managers are in the 
ordinary course of business formally accountable to shareholders alone.   
 
The main driver of this relatively narrow focus of company law and practice, which we might 
trace back to the neoliberal revolution of the 1970s,
24
 has been the aforementioned invocation 
of neo-classical economic analysis in US and UK corporate legal scholarship and policy-
making.  It was a discipline-shaping theoretical turn that effectively brought law and 
economics into the path of company and financial markets law.  At the heart of this doctrinal 
and normative analysis is a “contractarian” model of the company, and the rules related 
                                                 
19
 Art. 20 of Model Articles for Public Companies.   
20
 Section 168 of the Companies Act 2006.   
21
 Following extensive debate about this provision, the academic or practitioner consensus narrative suggests 
that it encapsulates a shareholder primacy approach, while the (unenforceable) social or public element of the 
duty is essentially ameliorative.  On this, see. e.g. Christopher Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common 
Law World (CUP 2013) at 32-33; Moore, above n 4 at 28 and 192-194; Daniel Attenborough, ‘The Neoliberal 
(Il)legitimacy of the Duty of Loyalty’ (2014) 65(4) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 405 esp. at 418-427. 
22
 ss260-264 of the Companies Act 2006. 
23
 General Principle 3 and Rule 21 of the UK’s Takeover Code prevent the types of unilateral action that a listed 
company’s board of directors may take when subject to an actual or imminent unsolicited takeover bid.  On this 
no frustration prohibition see e.g. David Kershaw, ‘The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK’s 
Takeover Defence Prohibition’ (2007) 56(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 267. 
24
 For some useful works on neoliberalism, see Raymond Plant, The Neoliberal State (OUP 2010); David 
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP 2007); Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and 
Global Order (Seven Stories Press 1998). 
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thereto,
25
 which has resonated with the traditional legal virtues of conservatism and classical 
liberalism.  While there were nascent contractarian views of company law and its institutions 
that were identifiable in a strand of legal scholarship during the late-nineteenth century,
26
 the 
modern brand of the theory was pioneered over several decades ago by the influential 
contributions of financial economists and company lawyers.
27
 In the fewest possible words, 
the theory frames the fundamental rules and structures of company law and corporate 
governance in “private” enabling or default terms,28 which implies that company law is 
essentially a derivative of contract law.
29
 The institutional competence of “legal positivist” 
ideas of law as mandated by the state or the courts are highly circumscribed due to the 
purportedly rent seeking, inefficient and restrictive effects on business.
30
 In place of such 
regulatory instruments, neo-classical economics, and especially its new institutional branch, 
idealises the self-regulatory capability of the market to endogenously produce and enforce 
rules to govern corporate activities.
31
 The “market” in this context refers to an uninhibited 
process of private bargaining between a collection of autonomous and rational individuals 
                                                 
25
 There are too many works in this genre to cite exhaustively.  For an overview, see e.g. Michael Whincop, 
‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 19 at 28; Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique 
of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 856 at 856. 
26
 M. Horwitz, ‘Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory’ (1985) 88 West Virginia Law 
Review 173 esp. at 184-185; M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal 
Orthodoxy (OUP, 1992), at 75, 94.   For a fascinating discussion of a purportedly more demonstrable 
formulation of the theory in 1934 fascist Germany, see E. McGaughey, ‘Ideals of the Corporation and the Nexus 
of Contracts’ (2015) 78(6) Modern Law Review 1057 at 1066-1068. 
27
 See generally, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic 
Organizations’ (1972) 62 American Economic Review 777; Jenson and Meckling, above n 15; Eugene Fama, 
‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economics 228; Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1416; and 
Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 16. 
28
 On the categorisation of legal rules, see Melvin Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of Corporation Law’ (1989) 89 
Columbia Law Review 1461. 
29
 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 16 at 166.  On the counter-intuitive claim that company law may be trivial, 
see Bernard Black, ‘Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis’ (1990) 84 Northerwestern 
University Law Review 542; Roberta Romano, ‘Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for 
Mandatory Corporate Laws’ (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1599. 
30
 On the limits of conventional law and regulation, see Dan Awrey, William Blair and David Kershaw, 
‘Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role For Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation?’ (2013) 38 
Delaware Journal of Corporation Law 191 at 198-205. 
31
 The classic accounts of Hayek’s distinction between constructed legal rules and de-centralised law are: 
Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Routledge 1973) esp. at 72-91; Friedrich Hayek, The Road to 
Serfdom (Routledge 1944) esp. at 75-90. 
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adapting themselves to circumstances, and it is this efficient cooperation and conflict that 
determines the substantive content of company law rules.
32
 When the presence of constitutive 
legal rules and structures is irrefutable, contractarian theory usually infuses formal law with a 
‘passive-instrumental’33 quality, whereby mandatory legal rules are viewed as “standard-form 
terms” that would otherwise tend to evolve were the costs of making adequate provision for 
all possible contingencies sufficiently low.
34
  
 
Based on the logic above, contractarian thinking disaggregates the existence of the company 
as a distinct legal institution into a market-directed bundle of contracts,
35
 either express or 
implied,
36
 and these notional bargains consist of many different kinds of risks and 
opportunities that are voluntarily exchanged amongst rational and self-interested 
participants.
37
 Accordingly, every corporate actor is said to contribute enterprise-specific 
inputs (for example, equity, human capital, credit loan, custom) in exchange for receiving 
material benefits for themselves (such as, dividend, interest, price, wage).  This logic has 
opened the way for a divisive reinvention of the shareholder’s primary or exclusive status 
within company law and corporate governance.  From a contractual perspective, non-equity 
interests are theoretically able to bargain in advance, or re-negotiate along the way, for more 
specific rights and obligations in respect to their investments, whether in terms of a fixed 
                                                 
32
 This is a process of “bottom up” rule making that Hayek, Schumpeter, and other lesser-known members of the 
“Austrian School” of economics refer to as giving rise to a “spontaneous order”.  The classic accounts of 
Hayek’s distinction between constructed legal rules and de-centralised law are: F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation 
and Liberty (Routledge, 1973) esp. at 72-91; F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge, 1944) esp. at 75-90. 
33
 Moore, above n 4 at 73.  For a similar US perspective, see e.g. Robert Thompson, ‘Corporate Law Criteria: 
Law’s Relation to Private Ordering’ (2005) 2(1) Berkeley Business Law Journal 97 at 98. 
34
 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 27 at 1428.  See also, Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfeld, ‘Impossibility 
and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis’ (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 83. 
35
 This is based on the view that debates about the personification of the corporate entity are preoccupied with 
abstract concepts rather than practical or concrete issues.  On this, see e.g. William Bratton, ‘The New 
Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1471 esp. at 
1493. 
36
 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 27 at 1428-1429. 
37
 Daniel Fischel, ‘The Corporate Governance Movement’ (1982) 35(6) Vanderbilt Law Review 1259 at 1273.  
For a general critique of economic rationality and its implications for the analysis of law, see Neil Duxbury, 
Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press 1997) at 364-381; Wanda Wiegers, ‘Economic Analysis 
of Law and “Private Ordering”: A Feminist Critique’ (1992) 42 University of Toronto Law Journal 170. 
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wage or interest rate, and so on.  The shareholder, rather, ranks behind the satisfaction of all 
rights that other parties have contracted for in advance because she is unable to bargain ex 
ante for a specified return from corporate activity.
38
 These equity investors have the 
“residual” claim in the sense that if the business risk causes the company to lose money, it 
comes from her profits; if it leads the company to make additional profit, all of it belongs to 
her.
39
 This lower priority, risk bearing, and costs associated with encouraging maximum 
corporate performance, in theory at least, mean that shareholders are collectively incentivised 
to demand additional legal protection and/or governance rights within the company to 
compensate for any disadvantage.
40
 The various other essentially autonomous and rationally 
self-interested corporate constituents are implicitly prepared to concede structural protection 
and governance rights because of a pre-established harmony between shareholder wealth and 
the long-term quantitative benefits for the company.
41
  
 
It follows that a typical feature of the system in which the heterogeneous market actors of the 
company recurrently interact with one another is that of an implied or sometimes explicit 
                                                 
38
 See Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 27 at 1425.  On complete and incomplete contracting generally, see 
Simon Deakin and Alan Hughes, ‘Economic Efficiency and the Proceduralisation of Company Law’ [1999] 
Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review 169 at 177.   
39
 Easterbrook and Fischel, ibid.  For criticism of the thesis that shareholders constitute residual claimants, see 
Lynn Stout, ‘Bad and Not-so-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 S Cal L Rev 1189 at 1193-
1195.  It is also worth noting that the changing ownership patterns of UK and US large publically traded 
companies over recent decades might call into question whether shareholders can be viewed as residual risk 
bearers, because the dominant players in financial markets are increasingly large institutional investors (such as 
financial institutions or sovereign wealth funds) whose clients might be said to be the ultimate risk bearers.  See 
e.g. Office for National Statistics, ‘Statistical Bulletin: Ownership of UK Quoted Shares 2014’ (2 September 
2015) available at 
<www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedshares/2015-09-02> 
[last accessed on 25 March 2016].   
40
 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 16 at 91. 
41
 A point made famous by Milton Friedman ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ 
(1970) The New York Times Magazine.  Cf. D. Millon ‘Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law’ (1993) 50(4) Washington and Lee Law Review 1373 at 1378, pointing out that, ‘[t]his view 
assumes that feasible… contracting strategies exist for correction of the harmful external effects of 
shareholder/management activity and, perhaps, that such effects are relatively uncommon.’  It is also worth 
noting that the environment is not privy to this notional bargaining process, which means that it has traditionally 
been viewed as an extra-contractual externality for which environmental regulation, rather than company law, 
represents the only available means of protection.  On this point, see D. Attenborough, ‘An Estoppel Based 
Approach to Enforcing Corporate Environmental Responsibilities’ (2016) 28(2) Journal of Environmental Law 
pp tbc.   
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acknowledgement of hierarchy according to relative status or authority at the point of 
bargaining.
42
 It is through this ranking process that the ‘complex, on-going, and 
unpredictable’43 enterprise-specific inputs and outputs can be brought into alignment so as to 
yield a particular organisational result.
44
 Although the level of specificity and emphasis varies 
from one voice to the next, there is little dissimilarity between neo-classical and especially 
institutional economics about this essential point.  In some sense, then, the recognitional 
capacity of contractarianism concedes that participants within the company are not 
necessarily equal.  In order to overcome this conceptual limitation, the theory makes an 
evaluative prediction, which imbues corporate participants with autonomy, economic 
rationality, and the imperative to self-maximisation.  This enables decision-makers to 
“freely” bargain for a proportionate and satisfactory share of the organisational rent through a 
strategic process of conflict and cooperation with one another.  However, the assumed 
capacity of a collection of corporate participants to endogenously coordinate themselves to 
fairly produce and enforce rules regulating their activities, paradoxically, fails to give 
adequate treatment to a less prominent question.  This enquiry relates to whether such rules 
and norms are universally inclusive of the structurally differentiated objectives and 
preferences of the suppliers, employees, creditors, and so on, associated with companies.  
Financial economists and company lawyers typically soften these questions about the 
significance of hierarchy and how it might interact with the character of the private order, its 
scope, and its components.  Instead, these commentators elect to reduce the multifaceted 
issue of hierarchy down to an artificially simplified game theoretic study of decision-making 
                                                 
42
 The classic example of this approach is R. H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
43
 L. A. Stout and M. M. Blair, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85(2) Virginia Law 
Review 247 at 278. 
44
 Jenson and Meckling, above n 15 at 307.   
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between the various enterprise-specific relations.
45
 So this moves achieves at a corporate 
conceptual level what neoliberal rationality does at a more general level, namely, erases an 
entire analytics of socio-economic power, subordination, and inequality from political 
understanding and from the law based upon it.
46
   
 
Overall, it is fair to suggest that the contractarian theory has permeated the theoretical 
discourse
47
 in US corporate legal scholarship,
48
 and inevitably influenced the academic 
writings of a number of UK and other Commonwealth company law textbooks
49
 and law 
review articles.
50
 Simultaneously, the theoretical discourse is the manifestation of a form of 
politics and it organises the political space, often with the intention of monopolising it.   To 
this end, it has found favour in various significant policy-making discussions that go to the 
                                                 
45
 This observation chimes with Robert Solow’s prescription for doing good economics, in which he asserts that  
‘[t]he very complexity of real life… [is what] makes simple [economic] models so necessary.’  See R. Solow, 
‘A Native Informant Speaks’ (2001) 8(1) Journal of Economic Methodology 111 at 111. 
46
 There literature on this subject is too extensive to cite.  In brief, Adam Smith’s view is that inequality of 
bargaining power stems from unequal possession of property.  See Smith, above n 1 esp. at section 8, section 12. 
Karl Marx considered this to be part of the ephemeral bourgeois ideology thrown up by any systems of private 
property ownership.  See e.g. K. Marx, Wage Labour and Capital (H. E. Lothrop (tr), New York Labor News 
Company, 1902 edn).  Thus, Smith and Marx, or indeed John Stuart Mill, would have had similar diagnosis, but 
drawn very different conclusions about what to do about it.  Various progressive critiques of company law exist, 
and argue in general that this legal domain and its institutions are a major site of major site of injustice in 
society.  See e.g. J. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, 1995).  Adolf Berle came 
to opine that corporate regulation could contribute to a more “rationalized” system of wealth distribution by 
establishing a charter of social and economic rights (in effect, nullifying the effects of unequal property and 
bargaining power). See ‘Property, Production and Revolution’ (1965) 65 Columbia Law Review 1. 
47
 Whincop, above n 25 at 28, asserting that ‘contractarian theory is inevitable because of the contractual 
qualities of corporations [emphasis added].’ 
48
 S. M. Bainbridge, ‘Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate 
Law Scholarship’ (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 856 at 856, observing that contractariansim has ‘mounted a 
largely hostile takeover of the corporate legal academy’. 
49
 It would be a crude oversimplification to suggest that these textbooks have uniformly and unreservedly 
endorsed a contractarian approach in UK company law and corporate governance.  However, the following 
examples include recognition as a historical-legal fact that the company can be viewed in contractual terms.  See 
e.g. P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower & Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 
9
th
 edn, 2012); D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and materials (OUP, 2
nd
 edn, 2012).  More explicit 
willingness to adopt a contractrian analysis can be found in R. Kraakman, et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: 
A Comparative and Functional Approach (OUP, 2
nd
 edn, 2009); B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, 
Structure and Operation (OUP, 1997). 
50
 Whincop, above n 25 at 28, asserting that ‘contractarian theory is inevitable because of the contractual 
qualities of corporations [emphasis added].’  Further support for this observation include, R. Grantham, ‘The 
Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders’ [1998] Cambridge Law Journal 554 at 578-579; J. E. 
Parkinson, ‘The Contractual Theory of the Company and the Protection of Non-Shareholder Interests’ in D. 
Feldman and F. Meisel (eds), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments (Lloyd’s of London 
Press, 1996) 121 at 121. 
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heart of UK company law and practice.
51
 Moreover, the rules of company law itself comprise 
many different elements that appear to give credence to a private contractual view of the 
company.  Most notably, the company’s articles of association contain primarily internal 
governance rules providing for its constitutional structure and distribution of power between 
the board and the shareholder body.  The rules set out in the corporate constitution are 
contractual terms upon which the shareholders agree to become associated with the 
company.
52
 Perhaps unsurprisingly UK law views the legal status of the constitution in 
contractual terms,
53
 and this conclusion resonates with a number of judicial pronouncements 
that ‘acknowledge contract as the animating force within company law.’54 Against this 
backdrop, the theoretical paradigm that is generally posited by commentators attempting to 
understand company law from a private contractual perspective remains hugely significant in 
providing the discipline’s vantage point for understanding and assessing that law.   
 
C. CONTRACTARIANISM’S FUNCTIONAL FALSITIES 
 
Despite the apparent ubiquity of contractarian theory, it is not without its opponents, and 
many of which have expressed serious misgivings about a number of clear limitations and 
internal inconsistencies that have become apparent in recent years.
55
 On the one hand, it is 
                                                 
51
 Law Commission Consultation Paper, Corporate Directors (1997 LCCP No.153); Department of Trade and 
Industry (now the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills), Modern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: The Strategic Framework (London: DTI 1999) at para. 2.4. 
52
 s 33 of the Companies Act 2006.   
53
 See e.g. Hickman v Kent Romney Marsh Sheep-Breeders Association [1915] 1 Ch 881.  On this, see David 
Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and materials (OUP 2
nd
 edn. 2012) at 79-87. 
54
 See e.g. Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards & Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 855.  On 22 February 2012 
the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal the decision.  On this point, see the excellent analysis in H. 
McVea, ‘Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 and the Primacy of Contract’ (2012) 75(6) Modern Law 
Review 1123.  Cf. the recent UK Supreme Court decisions in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd and others [2013] 
UKSC 34 and VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corporation and others [2013] UKCS 5, which endorse 
the Salomon principle, above n 13.  
55
 The classic critiques are Paddy Ireland, ‘Property and contract in contemporary corporate theory’ (2003) 
23(3) Legal Studies 453; William Bratton, ‘The ‘‘Nexus-of Contracts’’ Corporation: A Critical Appraisal’ 
(1989) 74 Cornell Law Review 407.  See also, B. R. Cheffins, ‘The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship’ 
(2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 456 at 485-487 (and accompanying footnotes), discussing the writings that 
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clear that contractarian theory does not provide a complete account of the company, and the 
rules related thereto, whether the inquiry limits itself to legal discourse or is posed at a more 
general level.  On the other hand, these criticisms have been made within the private-
prudential ideological climate of company law, which has traditionally been at best 
indifferent and at worst entirely hostile to even relatively moderate proposals for change in 
the way we think about law.
56
 Nonetheless, it is important to shed light on the deficiencies of 
the dominant contractarian paradigm because a generally accepted theory that attempts to 
understand the functions performed by company law provides the discipline’s presumed 
vantage point for describing and evaluating contemporary governance rules.  But if that 
intellectual framework is misguided, then accounts of the formation and application of those 
rules, and the contemporary vantage point of both scholar and law maker, finds itself in the 
wrong place.  Accordingly, this section exposes to view two further important 
presuppositions or assumptions underlying contractarian thought that have hitherto received 
insufficient attention.  These are the partial and therefore inaccurate depictions of hierarchy 
and market actor autonomy, and the theory’s rigid dichotomy between the capacity of 
markets to self-regulate and more traditional legal institutions and rule making.   
  
First of all, it will be recalled that private conceptions of company law in general recognise a 
somewhat modest existence of hierarchy within the notional company.  However, its 
significance as a component of private rule producing approaches is reduced and simplified 
within a more general political ideology embedded in autonomy and the promotion of 
individual freedom of choice.  It is submitted that this is an impoverished understanding of 
hierarchy, which elides the reality that all but the most powerful corporate actors often lack 
                                                                                                                                                        
have used the contractarian theory as a point of departure so as to develop a more fully rounded conception of 
company law. 
56
 M. Moore, ‘Bridging the Gap Between Labour Law and Company Law’ (2015) 44(3) Industrial Law Journal 
425 at 425. 
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the actual or economic freedom to choose an agreement or the terms of that bargain, even 
though they might be legally free to strike whatever contract they choose.
57
 In practice, this 
uneven political-economic structure means that the weaker subjects of the company, and the 
rules related thereto, can rarely choose, dissent, or exit from it.  It is therefore more accurate 
to acknowledge the latent and illegitimate role of hierarchy based on wealth, influence, and 
power, which work to emphasise the relative primacy of equity holders within the notional 
company over countervailing demands.  More importantly still, these political-economic 
configurations are in general a pre-existing and essential component of the formation and 
nature of spontaneous governance.  This hierarchy enables dominant market actors, namely, 
the shareholders, to directly or indirectly influence weaker members to use the private system 
even when the given allocations of entitlements are not in their interests to do so.  When 
power holders make access to resources or participation in the organisational setting 
contingent upon the use of private mechanisms of resource allocation created by them, the 
threat of losing access to these resources produces not only the “choice” to use these private 
forums, but also compliance with their decisions.
58
 The acknowledgement that incentive 
structures are not unanimously agreed upon between corporate actors, but are apportioned 
based on standing in the hierarchy, improves our ability to explain which controller-selecting 
and substantive norms the group adopts.  When a private order develops, power holders in the 
group tend to rely on it to maintain their power by preserving and manufacturing norms that 
deepen and embed intragroup hierarchy, thus guaranteeing both the private order and their 
own continued control over that ordering process.   
                                                 
57
 M. R. Cohen, ‘The Basis of Contract’ (1933) 46(4) Harvard Law Review 553 at 568, remarking that ‘[a]s the 
result of the various forces that have thus supported the cult of contractualism there has been developed in all 
modern European countries (and in those which derive from them) a tendency to include within the categories of 
contract transactions in which there is no negotiation, bargain, or genuinely voluntary agreement.’ 
58
 G. M. Hodgson, ‘On the Institutional Foundations of Law: The Insufficiency of Custom and Private Ordering’ 
(2009) 43(1) Journal of Economic Issues 143 at 157, noting that ‘[t]he [Stanley] Milgram experiments 
provide… some striking empirical material.  Species existing in social groups for millions of years evolve 
dispositions to obey those in apparent authority.  In specific cultural settings, we learn to recognise individuals 
in social positions with authority over others.’ See also, N. Chomsky, ‘Community Activists’ in P. R. Mitchell 
and J. Schoeffel (eds), Understanding Power: The Indispensible Chomsky (Vintage, 2003) at 196-198. 
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A second oversimplification from the contractarian theory is the depiction of private ordering 
as ‘a profound example of free markets’,59 whose norms ‘are not manufactured or enforced 
by the state’60 in which an official legal system of some sort exists.  The normative effect is 
to view the appropriate role of public regulation as merely correcting any structural failure in 
the endogenous rule making, by authoritatively producing market-mimicking principles on 
either a mandatory or at least default basis.  It is through this lens that law and economics 
tends in general to impute a passive-instrumental role to state interventionist approaches 
when it comes to the regulation of the governance of the company.
61
 However, legal realism 
and critical legal studies,
62
 amongst other schools of social-scientific enquiry,
63
 have 
demonstrated convincingly that most, if not all, law is “public” in the sense that it is 
conditional upon the state.  The proposition therefore that ‘markets are legal, political (and, 
therefore, regulatory) products, not spontaneously arising, pre-regulatory, pre-legal and pre-
political phenomena’64 would today scarcely be viewed outside of contractarian thinking as a 
new or exciting truth.  In this regard, it is submitted that the actual role of the state is 
qualitatively different to the traditional functionally reflexive one embedded in the 
                                                 
59
 O. Yadlin, ‘A Public Choice Approach to Private Ordering: Rent-Seeking at the World’s First Futures 
Exchange’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2620 at 2625. 
60
 Ibid at 2620. 
61
 Moore, above n 4 at 73. 
62
 See e.g. V. Nourse and G. Shaffer, ‘Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New 
Legal Theory?’ (2009) 95 Cornell Law Review 61; H. Erlanger, B. Garth, J. Larson, E. Mertz, V. Nourse, and 
D. Wilkins, ‘Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?’ (2005) Wisconsin Law Review 335.  The observation that all 
law is essentially a constituent element of public interests, power, and democracy, might lead to the normative 
extension of the state’s acceptable political authority in company law and corporate governance.  For arguments 
that run along these lines, see D. Oliver, Common Values and the Public-Private Divide (CUP, 1999) at chapter 
11; E. Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (OUP, 2011) at Part I.  For an excellent 
overview of the public/private distinction in law, see also the published symposium: (1982) 130(6) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1331-1588. 
63
 P. Leeson, ‘Anarchy Unbound: how much order can spontaneous order create?’ in P. J. Boettke, Handbook on 
Contemporary Austrian Economics (Edward Elgar, 2010) at 136, noting that, ‘[a]ccording to conventional 
wisdom, spontaneous order may be able to create some limited order in the “shadow of the state.”  But it cannot 
create enough order to make the state unnecessary.  Spontaneous order may flourish within the government-
created meta-rules of social order.  But it cannot create such meta-rules itself.’ 
64
 P. Ireland, ‘Law and the Neoliberal Vision: Financial Property, Pension Privatisation and the Ownership 
Society’ (2011) 62(1) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 1 at 29.  See also, D. Campbell, ‘Review Article: The 
End of Posnerian Law and Economics’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 305 at 326. 
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contractarian psyche.  In view of the inherent shareholder centricity of modern UK company 
law, state interventionist strategies, often in the form of de-centralised, networked forms of 
regulation,
65
 purposefully establish and preserve through positive action an artificial 
institutional framework appropriate to the efficient profit-making practices of private 
ordering.
66
 The degrees of intervention across traditional regulatory approaches range from 
acknowledging the existence of private orders, strategic omissions that lead to the their 
emergence, or imposing them on aspects of a society that may be reluctant to participate in 
transactional and collective relations in an extra legal manner.  Overall, the upshot is that 
constitutive legal rules are a necessary precondition and engineer of the development and 
nature of spontaneous governance.   
 
D. THE EMPIRICS OF BROADER PRIVATE ORDERING 
 
The following examples serve to emphasise the distinctive and essential correlative and 
causal relationship between hierarchy and private ordering in merchant communities, whilst 
simultaneously drawing attention to the fact that the formation and nature of the private order 
is inextricably conditional upon positive state interventionist approaches.  While this specific 
ethnographic research on private ordering typically documents these two parallel strands, the 
literature ignores their significance, and so this section provides a more textured account of 
spontaneous governance in each of the case studies, and a more compelling explanation of 
that ordering process.  This presents an opportunity to relate innovative and reliable studies of 
actual private ordering practices to contractarian theories of the regulation of the governance 
of the company.  Despite the enduring promise of the empirical legal movement, few legal 
                                                 
65
 S. Picciotto, ‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?’ (2008) 6(3) International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 457. 
66
 Harvey, above n 24 at 2; B. Amable, ‘Morals and Politics in the Ideology of Neoliberalism’ (2011) Socio-
Economic Review 3 at 10. 
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academics and practitioners publish meaningful empirical studies in law reviews, the primary 
forum for legal academic discourse.
67
 This is despite the general view that many important 
standards in company law are based on assumptions about how the world works.
68
 A central 
argument of this article therefore is that it is crucial for company lawyers and scholars, as 
good inter-disciplinary social scientists, to seek to add a empirical element to their positive 
and theoretical understandings of legal phenomena.  Similarly, the corporate legal academy 
must be willing to change course if experience and evolution in the commercial world 
suggest that modifications in prior understandings are warranted.  Empirically driven, 
positive doctrinal analysis is in general most enriching for two reasons.  First, this type of 
analysis has a dramatic impact when it calls into question the descriptive accuracy of clear, 
well established “black letter law” or consensus theoretical understanding about that law.69 
Second, even when the primary use of empirical data is to describe doctrine or the effect of 
doctrine on behaviour, there is also an additional goal of using descriptive conclusions to 
support one or more normative claims about the way the law ought to be.
70
 These insights, in 
turn, may be used to inform legal policy, law making, and legal theory about the design 
and/or operation of the corporate regulatory system. 
 
1. The New York Diamond Dealers Club 
 
Writing in the early 1990s, Lisa Bernstein’s pioneering study of ultra-orthodox Jewish 
                                                 
67
 On this observation about company law, see Armour, above n 10 at 468.  On the absence of empirical analysis 
in legal scholarship more generally, see M. Heise, ‘The Importance of Being Empirical’ (1999) 26 Pepperdine 
Law Review 807 at 834; D. L. Rhode, ‘Legal Scholarship’ (2002) 115 Harvard Law Review 1327 at 1357-58.  
Cf. T. S. Ulen, ‘A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the 
Study of Law’ (2002) 4 University of Illinois Law Review 875. 
68
 L. E. Strine, ‘The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations’ (2002) 27 
Delaware Journal of Corporation Law 499 at 499. 
69
 R. Korobkin, ‘Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls’ (2002) 4 University of 
Illinois Law Review 1033 at 1044-45. 
70
 Ibid at 1048. 
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merchants who dominate New York’s enigmatic diamond industry71 examines a community 
that is purported to systematically enforce commercial agreements through private order 
institutions and extra-legal sanctions in ways that are intended to make the public legal 
system largely extraneous to their interactions.  Since the foundation of the Diamond Dealers 
Club in the early 1930s, Jewish merchants who overwhelmingly comprise the diamond 
industry have developed an elaborate, internal arrangement of rules, complete with distinctive 
institutions and disciplinary techniques, to resolve disputes and controversies among industry 
members and others.  Consistent with the model, the industry’s arrival at private ordering is 
explained by the transactional hazards of enforcing diamond credit sales, the particular 
importance of high-powered market incentives, and the relatively low costs of entry barriers.  
With approximately 2000 members, the club has grown into the largest diamond trade 
organisation in the US, and one of the leading diamond exchanges in the world.  In an 
industry where important economic advantage depends largely on a dealer’s network of 
contacts, membership gives a merchant presence and prestige, disseminates accurate and 
reliable information about other dealers’ reputations, and access to a steady supply of 
precious stones.  As a condition of membership, a dealer must sign an agreement to 
voluntarily submit to all disputes arising from the diamond business between herself and 
another member to the club’s arbitration system.  The agreement to arbitrate is binding.  The 
club’s procedural rules clearly reflect the industry’s preference for the voluntary resolution of 
disputes.  The bylaws are structured to give the parties control over the dispute resolution 
process and to create financial incentives to settle.  Unless the club’s private arbitration panel 
opts not to hear the case,
72
 the member may not seek judicial redress of her grievance.  If she 
does so, she will be fined or expelled from the club.   
 
                                                 
71
 Bernstein, above n 5 at 115. 
72
 Ibid at 126-127, noting that this can happen for a number of reasons, but particularly when a claim has been 
conciliated, mediated, arbitrated or litigated outside of the club and/or parties have sought remedies elsewhere. 
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Any member of the club who has a claim arising out of or related to the diamond business 
against another member has the right to file a written complaint against the member who 
must then submit to the club’s legally binding private adjudication. According to Bernstein, 
arbitration is more efficient than litigation because it is cheaper, industry relevant, and 
subjects the member to unique pressures to settle promptly.
73
 More importantly still, provided 
judgments are complied with, the existence of the arbitration proceeding as well as its 
eventual outcome is officially kept undisclosed, which avoids social ostracism and 
reputational damage.
74
 Given the well-established institutional premium on secrecy as well as 
the barriers to public enforcement, very few merchant disputes spill into New York’s state 
courts.
75
 Disputes are, instead, enforced exclusively through the Diamond Dealers Club’s 
threat of private, extralegal sanctions.  The club’s board of arbitrators does not apply New 
York law of contract and damages; rather it resolves disputes on the basis of endogenous 
trade customs and usages.  Many of these are set forth with particularity in the club’s bylaws, 
and others simply are implicitly known and accepted.  In general, the board of arbitrator’s use 
suspension, rather than expulsion, as an informal default rule to secure compliance with its 
decisions.
76
 Another enforcement mechanism sometimes invoked by the arbitrators is a 
proceeding in Jewish rabbinical courts against the party who refuses to comply with a 
judgment.  Because these courts have the authority to ban an individual from participation in 
the Jewish community, this is a powerful threat against Orthodox members of the diamond 
industry.
77
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 Ibid at 126. 
74
 Ibid at 124. 
75
 B. D. Richman, ‘Community Enforcement of Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York’ 
Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper No. 384 (2002) 
at 15, available at 
<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1719&context=faculty_scholarship> [last 
accessed on 25 March 2016], noting that a party can appeal an arbitration board decision to New York state 
court only if there is a procedural irregularity.  The board’s substantive decisions are not reviewed.  See 
Rabinowitz v Olewski, 100 A.D. 2d 539 (1984); see also Goldfinger v Lisker, 508 N.Y.S. 2d 159 (1986). 
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The club’s private ordering processes have been interpreted as part of the unique commercial 
requirements of an industry, and not of New York’s Jewish society in general.  It is possible 
that the Jewish approach to private ordering has been particularly useful in the context of the 
diamond trade, but this is a very different claim from the standard argument that the club’s 
mediation processes arose as an efficiency-oriented institution.  Indeed, the existence of the 
Diamond Dealers Club is difficult to comprehend in isolation from New York’s pre-existing 
Jewish community and its hierarchical institutions based on economic dependency.
78
 When 
embedded in its broader context, it is submitted that the club is, in fact, the endogenous 
outcome of New York’s Jewish community of the late 1920s and depends on that socio-
cultural context for rules and norms.
79
 To explain, the Russian pogroms of 1918 to 1921 
resulted in large swathes of Jewish immigration to New York City.  In response to this 
problem, two Jewish lawyers established the Jewish Court of Arbitration, which held its first 
session in early 1920.  The passing of the New York Arbitration Act 1920, followed by the 
US Arbitration Act 1925 (now known as the Federal Arbitration Act), meant that agreements 
to arbitrate were valid and mediators’ decisions given legally binding effect at common law.80 
The Jewish Court of Arbitration was replete with intergroup hierarchies in terms of both 
structure and substance, and this played a crucial role in the creation of private ordering 
within Jewish communities.
81
 In general, the court reinforced traditional or religious-based 
hierarchies as well as the Jewish laws and norms that supported the stratified social structure 
that had produced it in the first place.  First, using a combination of positive and negative 
                                                 
78
 Richman, above n 75 at 17, observing that, ‘nearly 85-90% of DDC members are Jewish’ and ‘[s]ince 
Orthodox Jews tend to live in specific, insular communities, this means that familiar business relationships are 
also familiar community relationships, and the members’ ties to each other do not end at the Club’s door.’ 
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 On the extent to which economic action is embedded in structures of social relations, see M. Granovetter, 
‘Economic Action and Social Structure’ (1985) 91(3) American Journal of Sociology 481. 
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 English law equally states that any third party can be agreed by two sides to arbitrate in a commercial or 
domestic dispute. 
81
 Gomez, above n 7 at 228, noting that, interaction with endogenous rules ‘is conditioned by the existence of an 
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incentives, they produced a legal culture of avoiding public courts.  Second, they served as 
enforcement mechanisms for the arbitral decisions of private forums.  Third, they produced a 
clear, normative value ranking, without which effective informal sanctioning would not have 
been possible.   
 
The Jewish court generally reinforced the traditional (religion-based) hierarchies as well as 
the Jewish laws and norms that supported the stratified social structure that had produced it in 
the first place.  Further, there was a clear socio-economic gap between the court’s mediators 
(rabbis, lawyers, judges, and distinguished laypeople) and the parties to the mediation 
(eastern European immigrants who lived in the impoverished Lower East Side 
neighborhood).  These hierarchical differences were emphasised to engender confidence and 
implicit obedience.
82
 Simultaneously, affluent members of the community directed the 
immigrants' disputes to the Jewish court by using a set of positive and negative incentives.  
First, the Jewish court was free of charge and conducted in the immigrant’s native Yiddish 
language.  Second, one of the unwritten precepts was that, to help resolve the dispute, the 
affluent, influential judges promised financial, employment-related, or personal support to 
those claimants who agreed to use the court.
83
  In other words, use of the court was 
incentivised by the promise that it would provide access to wealthy and influential members 
of the community.  On the negative side, the court’s arbitrators frequently persuaded litigants 
not to take their cases to public courts so as to avoid the dishonoring of the Jewish good name 
by dragging unseemly situations into a non-Jewish court.
84
 Jewish claimants who opted to 
present a case before a public court were ostracised by the community, since such an action 
                                                 
82
 Ibid at 229, remarking that, ‘compliance with indigenous norms tends to be high basically because group 
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 Ibid at 89. 
 Empirical Insights into Corporate Contractarian Theory  24 
 
was regarded as undermining the authority of Jewish law and the rabbinical courts.
85
 To 
understand the full implications of this social exclusion, the benefits of inclusion in the 
community require explanation.  For example, membership in associations based on locality 
in the country of origin gave them sick benefits, compensation for loss of earnings for those 
sitting a ritualistic week-long mourning period after a death in the family, burial plots and 
funeral expenses, which were made available to paid-up members in good standing.
86
 Thus, 
exclusion from the community and its associations impaired the immigrants' ability to survive 
in the new country. 
 
The arbitration system of the Diamond Dealers Club equally depends on Jewish community 
institutions for enforcement.  There are two ways in which these institutions enforce the 
club’s decisions: one is through the rabbinical courts, and the other is through the use of 
coordinated informal sanctions.  It is fair to suggest that most diamond merchants do not 
conduct business with a person who has been sanctioned for dishonest business activity, 
because ‘their own reputation will suffer if they are known to transact with previous 
cheaters.’87 On a formal level, the rabbinical courts can excommunicate a wrongdoer – a 
direct enforcement instrument that is rarely used – or the club arbitration committee can itself 
initiate a proceeding in a rabbinical court.
88
 Less formal institutions also play a role in 
enforcing contractual compliance.  There are numerous tangible, identifiable community 
goods, which have subtle hierarchies that dominate Orthodox Judaism.  Relatively nuanced 
distinctions can translate into either valued privileges or disappointing slights, and the 
numerous religious goods offers community leaders an array of sanctions with varying 
degrees of severity.  Community leaders can adjust these sanctions to correspond to the 
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severity of the offence caused, bringing about the desired deterrence without expending 
community resources.
89
 For instance, ‘when the community is familiar with a member’s 
failure to comply with contractual obligations, religious leaders often withhold excludable 
community goods, such as participation in daily prayer, honors in life-cycle ceremonies, 
access to classes or teachers that are in limited supply, or enrollment in particularly select 
educational classes.’90 Another important informal sanction relates to marriage.  Arranged 
marriage is the norm is many ultra-Orthodox communities, and a family's ability to find a 
good match for their offspring depends to a great extent on the family's reputation. Failure to 
comply with private Jewish forums for dispute resolution compromises the family's 
community status and, therefore, their offspring's chances of an appropriate match.
91
 In 
merchant communities, a merchant’s dependence on her community’s resources drives her 
ultimate compliance with the industry’s norms and private rulings.92 
 
To summarise, the Diamond Dealers Club developed, and continues to exist, because the 
diamond merchants are not only a profit-oriented community, but also part of a larger 
community with its own legal culture. The club depends on that community for norms, 
enforcement, and population-screening mechanisms.  The role and status of individuals 
within the cultural community are indistinguishable from their position in the trade 
community.  The Diamond Dealers Club is part of a larger private-ordering mechanism that 
utilises class-based (Jewish Court of Arbitration) and religious (rabbinical courts) hierarchies 
to regulate itself.  Economic dependency, along with the requisite inclusion in the 
community, produces trust, which in turn facilitates extralegal contracting.  In addition, 
hierarchies are necessary to create a clear normative code, to induce people to avoid the 
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public order, and to enforce private settlements.  As such, the club’s system of dispute 
resolution cannot be viewed as an egalitarian enclave in a sea of hierarchy, distinguished 
from the culture that created it and enforces its decisions. 
 
Turning to the role of the modern, functioning public order in the development of legitimate 
private orders within its jurisdiction, the first example of a qualitative restructuring of the 
state, involving not so much less regulatory intervention as a different kind of state 
intervention is that of the aforementioned New York state legislative reform project in the 
early 1920s.  It will be recalled that this had the effect of explicitly recognising at common 
law the validity of private agreements to arbitrate.  More importantly still, it can be seen as an 
artificial manipulation of the conditions necessary for a spontaneous order, where incentives 
are constructed ‘to provide inducements that will make the individuals do the desirable things 
without anyone having to tell them what to do.’93 This insight clearly reduces (although does 
not eliminate) the substance of previous claims that the emergence of private orders is 
attributable to the dysfunctional nature of the centralised law making.
94
 Along similar lines, 
the Jewish Court of Arbitration was supported by public courts, which recognised its power 
by refusing to reverse decisions on appeal.
95
 Indeed, ‘the civil courts and the various social 
services agencies recommended the Jewish Court of Arbitration’s services to those who in 
their view would best be served by [it] [emphasis added].’96 It is unclear how vague the 
standard of “best served” was interpreted by the relevant authorities, but evidence suggests 
that the civil and criminal actions of low-status Jews were often referred to the hierarchical 
Jewish court on the basis of religious and/or ethnic grounds rather than the substance of the 
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case.
97
 Public officials were aware of the stratified context within which the Jewish court’s 
adjudications took place.  In a 1954 keynote speech to mark the 35
th
 anniversary of the 
Jewish Conciliation Board of America (successor to the Jewish Court of Arbitration), then 
Supreme Court Justice, William Douglas, spoke about “The Problems of the Little People” 
with which the Jewish court admirably contended.
98
 In sum, the type of private order 
developed is contingent not only on the flaws affecting the public order, but also on the 
positive attitude of the law toward the private order.
 99
 
 
2. Rancher Relations in Shasta County, California 
 
A second example of the role of hierarchies and the public order in the development of extra-
legal orders is the case of Shasta County, California.  Robert Ellickson’s Order without 
Law
100
 observed that Shasta County residents – contrary to the predictions of Ronald Coase’s 
fêted 1960 article
101
 and much of the law and economics scholarship – ignore formal legal 
rules and engage in mutually advantageous cooperation by turning to adaptive norms to 
informally shape social behaviour and settle disputes.
102
 The parties in this community are 
owners of smaller “ranchettes”, who are recently settled ‘retirees or younger migrants from 
California’s major urban areas’,103 and established cattlemen who own and operate large, 
intergenerational family ranches that may be worth more than a million dollars.  These 
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cattlemen are further distinguished as traditionalists or modernists.  Traditionalists tend to be 
less economically successful and allow their cattle to roam in unfenced mountain areas 
during the summer.  Modernist cattlemen fence in their livestock, are economically more 
prosperous, tend to be younger than traditionalists, and more active in the Shasta County 
Cattlemen’s Association.104 Ellickson describes the relations of cattlemen and ranchette 
owners in the context of incidents involving stray cattle, which are owned by cattlemen but 
often trespass on the property of ranchette owners or on nearby highways, where cattle and 
drivers are often seriously injured or even killed in collisions.  In his account, the way these 
incidents are addressed exposes an emergent order that is produced through exogenous 
foundational rules that exist without regard to the law.  He describes these norms as ‘non-
hierarchical processes of coordination’105 and argues that an idealised sphere of 
neighbourliness is shaped ‘beyond the reach of the law.’106 
 
However, there are a number of difficulties with the path that Ellickson takes away from legal 
centralism, particularly in respect of the impoverished evidence to support the notions of 
individual consent and equality that are so central to his narrative of emergent order.  Further, 
at some points in the book, he documents the effect that the law does seem have on informal 
order-producing processes, but leaves its significance hidden or half-articulated.
107
 The 
problem is that Ellickson’s model of human nature, like much of the literature in law and 
economics, is over-simplistic, depicting behavior as rational and self-interested in every 
context.
108
 This undeveloped calculus seems strikingly incongruous to the actual grievances 
and disputes that permeate his over-arching account of voluntary cooperation in a purportedly 
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close-knit cattle country.  While these groups are geographically integrated, what Ellickson 
systematically fails to appreciate are the numerous embedded asymmetries between ‘a 
traditional agrarian order’ and ‘an emerging urban rival’.109 The rivalry revolves around 
efforts to change the legal regime of Shasta County from open to closed range.  Shasta 
County's residents believe that the liability of the owners of stray livestock for injurious 
events increases when a certain range is declared closed.  Moreover, a closed range 
diminishes the cattlemen’s ability to solve disputes privately, as it introduces a legal norm 
that can be enforced by law enforcement officials and the courts.  An open range entails a 
very narrow interpretation of legal trespass as well as a broad interpretation of inevitable 
injurious events; it is thus associated with traditional norms, including private resolution of 
disputes that allow cattlemen to protect their interests regardless of the formal law.
110
  
 
In terms of the capacity of these parties to exert influence over one another, cattlemen and 
ranchette owners significantly diverge, not only in the size and type of their material 
resources and in the depth of their knowledge of local ways,
111
 but also in their symbolic 
status and the strength of their political connections to others in the county.  Ranchette 
owners are relatively politically isolated because few of them have been in the area for long, 
and in recruiting cattlemen to their cause because even the modernists, who tend to fence in 
their cattle, tend to united with traditionalists in opposing proposed legal changes that would 
lead to increased liability for owners of stray cattle.
112
 Moreover, ranchette owners also lack 
the established ties to local officials that cattlemen have; officials have dealt with cattlemen 
regularly over the years and depend on them for positions as county supervisors, brand 
                                                 
109
 Ellickson, above n 6 at 117. 
110
 Ibid at 25. 
111
 Ibid at 21 and 64, commenting that the shallow roots of ranchette owners in the area are reflected in 
cattlemen’s perceptions that they are ‘not away of the natural working order’, while ranchette owners ‘admire 
both the cattlemen and the folkways traditionally associated with rural Shasta County.’ 
112
 Ibid at 25. 
 Empirical Insights into Corporate Contractarian Theory  30 
 
inspectors, or animal control officers.  Finally, they are at a disadvantage because of a 
historical bias in Shasta and other northern county legislatures in favour of the traditional 
ranching method of running cattle at large.
113
 Because of the relative disempowerment of 
ranchette owners, the cattlemen’s preferred choice of self-enforced norms prevails, which 
allows them to protect their interests and eschew the formal law.  Their power enables them 
to intentionally avoid regulatory interference in this private dispute processing, even when it 
involves a violation of state law.  The norm of private dispute management serves to 
reinforce Shasta County's social structure, where cattlemen are the ruling elite.  In keeping 
with this norm, the powerful cattlemen tend to respond to grievances by using force and 
relying on their capital to keep the authorities from intervening in their unlawful activities, 
while ranchette owners are left without power to respond to trespassing by the cattlemen’s 
animals.  This combination results in a situation whereby cattle roam freely and cause 
damages that go uncompensated, while ranchette owners “choose” not to commence legal 
proceedings or even submit informal monetary claims, in an unreciprocated effort to maintain 
positive relations with the cattlemen.   
 
To summarise, controller-selecting norms in Shasta County are embedded in local 
hierarchies.  The powerful cattlemen use (sometimes violent) self-help measures, while the 
officials overlook such disputes.  Ranchette owners, on the other hand, lack the social capital 
to succeed in the execution of private justice.  As a result, they either seek the assistance of 
public officials (who usually turn them down), thereby running the risk of violating local 
norms of neighborliness, or absorb their grievances toward cattlemen and “choose” to get 
along. 
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Another weakness of Ellickson’s research is the failure to appreciate the fact that private 
ordering generally takes place under the aegis of the public order, which controls its 
implementation and sets its boundaries.  In Shasta County, the legal regime of open range, to 
a large extent, produced ‘the neighbourly order of… absorbing the damage from trespass 
incidents.’114 In 1945, a Californian statute devolved the power to create local norms by 
authorising the Shasta County Board of Supervisors, which is a locally elected governing 
body, to “close the range” in sub-areas of the county.115 In doing so, the state transferred rule 
making to local elective institutions, thereby determining that a crucial norm would be shaped 
by the local power structure.  The role of local hierarchies in the creation of norms by the 
board is apparent in two cases presented by Ellickson, although he incorrectly frames these 
cases as anomalies, when in fact they are better viewed as a form of regulatory capture by the 
ruling elites of Shasta County.  The first case in 1973 involved three traditionalist cattlemen 
who let their cattle roam freely and ignored their neighbour’s complaints about the resulting 
damages.  Out of frustration, a petition was filed to close the particular range, and this was 
sent to John Caton, a newly elected board member and ranchette owner himself.  At the 
hearing, two of the three cattlemen did not attend, while even the more active Shasta County 
Cattlemen’s Association did not send a representative that, collectively, had the symbolic 
effect of dismissing the hearing as inconsequential.  In fact, to reinforce their norm of private 
ordering, they ignored the hearing altogether and used informal sanctions, which were much 
more effective and enduring: after Caton and the other board members voted in favour of the 
closure, ‘to chide him for supporting what they regarded as a lamentable precedent, [the 
cattlemen] referred to the affected area as “Catton’s Folly”.  Caton got the point.  During the 
next decade, he successfully persuaded the Shasta County Board of Supervisors to reject all 
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petitions that would have closed additional territories… of his district.’116 
 
A further example of this process appears in Ellickson’s account of a cattleman who had 
experienced many years earlier recurring problems with a trespassing bull.  This cattleman 
told a law enforcement official that he wanted to neuter the bull as an act of punishment, and 
the official replied that he would overlook the act if it did occur.  The cattleman asserted that 
he then carried out his threat.
117
 In this case, the law enforcement official produced a space of 
non-intervention that enabled the emergence of private ordering.  By contrast, the lower-
ranked ranchette owners are generally informed, in a variety of ways, that their claims will 
not be addressed by the public order, and this leaves them with no option but to submit to 
intragroup hierarchies.  Traditionalist cattlemen, who aspire to maintain an open range regime 
in Shasta County, have a powerful lobby that connects them to county officials.  Despite the 
range of remedies offered by the formal legal system, the latter dissuade the victims of cattle 
trespass from submitting claims and, instead, inform them of the cattlemen’s open range 
rights.  By electing to inform the ranchette owners of these particular rights, rather than the 
ranchette owner’s legal right to seize the trespassing animals, to obtain an injunction against 
the cattle owner in certain cases, and/or to receive compensation, the county officials 
intentionally direct ranchette owners away from the formal legal system, thereby contributing 
to the creation and perpetuation of Shasta’s private ordering. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
For several decades or more, the literature on company law has been dominated by a singular 
and rather myopic economic vision of that law and its institutions.  In the pursuit to 
                                                 
116
 Ibid at 32. 
117
 Ibid at 58. 
 Empirical Insights into Corporate Contractarian Theory  33 
 
understand the enterprise-specific interactions between corporate actors, this dominant 
disciplinary prism views the company, and the rules related thereto, merely as a nexus of 
explicit and implicit contracts.  The logical implication is that company law rule making is 
essentially a variety of contract law, in which important corporate governance arrangements 
are the private outcome of a decentred, market-oriented process of negotiation, bargaining, 
and informational leverage between notionally rational participants that have an interest in 
the venture.  This, in turn, is connected with the neo-classical economic optimism that there is 
a sort of pre-established harmony between the good of all and the pursuit by each of her own 
selfish economic gains.  The upshot is that spontaneous governance can arise in a 
decentralised, emergent fashion even within large communities of participants.  However, it 
is not simply the nuanced and private nature of corporate governance arrangements that is 
significant.  Equally notable is the frequent interactions that take place between law and 
markets.  Taking their lead from neoliberal rationalities, proponents of this politico-economic 
theory have argued that conventional regulatory approaches, which are rooted in the 
bureaucratic form of centralised state agencies and realised through the medium of 
formalistic law, are a largely external and regressive force to be resisted in the interests of 
efficient profit making.  Clearly, there is valuable potential in this theoretical turn to situate 
the animating principles of company law within a broader conceptual framework that gives 
meaning and coherence to them.  However, what this literature largely has lacked, to date, is 
an empirical structure that unites it with physical or concrete experience of how private 
systems of rules work to regulate socio-economic relations among the groups that adopt 
them.  The present argument, then, identifies two functional falsities of the orthodox 
understanding of the company as a major site of private ordering established through 
contract.  It provided these insights through a critical reflection on the wider private ordering 
literature, which has expanded exponentially over the last two decades.   
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There can be little doubt that much of this empirical evidence has generated interesting and 
important understandings into cases in which parties have established private legal systems 
for governing their behaviour and resolving their disputes.  Yet a closer reading of two 
pioneering and representative ethnographic studies provides a different narrative, and is one 
that offers valuable direct insights for economic and economically influenced company law 
scholarship.  The first insight is that corporate private ordering is created not necessarily 
because private governance arrangements are efficient or more efficient than public 
lawmaking institutions, nor can they be viewed as choice-based, voluntary, and consensual 
mechanisms for achieving socio-economic order that is better aligned with individual liberty 
and autonomy than the coercive legal system.  The critical analysis of actual private orders in 
this article points, instead, to the conclusion that such structures typically develop in an 
existing context of hierarchical power relations whereby the more dominant members of that 
network are intent on deepening and entrenching a system of order.  This tiered structure is 
clearly reflected in a general trend in company and securities law since the 1970s towards the 
increasing dominance of capital (above social or public concerns) and an associated political 
project to orientate equity holders at the centre of the corporate governance process.  Second, 
it has been argued that the insights from the empirical analysis of this article show that the 
theoretical economic inquiry into endogenously generated rules obscures the interaction 
between law and markets.  It is important to understand that private ordering or other 
regulators of corporate behaviour do not inevitably come from self-enforcing natural law.  
More precisely, many non-legal norms and rules, if they are to operate at all, arise and persist 
because of intentional dynamic strategies employed by the regulatory state and its organs to 
facilitate and influence the utility and nature of private orders.
118
 These understandings serve 
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to further call into question the inherent shareholder exclusivity of modern UK company law, 
and also the idealised capabilities of spontaneous governance that are expressed in law and 
economics literature.  It is therefore time to re-orientate and correct the explanatory lens 
through which to think about, write about, and teach what a company is and why it exists.   
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